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Abstract
We present results on the last topic we collaborate with our late friend, Professor
Ajoy Kumar Datta (1958-2019), who prematurely left us few months ago.
In this work, we shed new light on a self-stabilizing wave algorithm proposed by
Colette Johnen in 1997 [Joh97]. This algorithm constructs a BFS spanning tree in any
connected rooted network. Nowadays, it is still the best existing self-stabilizing BFS
spanning tree construction in terms of memory requirement, i.e., it only requires Θ(1)
bits per edge. However, it has been proven assuming a weakly fair daemon. Moreover,
its stabilization time was unknown.
Here, we study the slightly modified version of this algorithm, still keeping the
same memory requirement. We prove the self-stabilization of this variant under the
distributed unfair daemon and show a stabilization time in O(D · n2) rounds, where D
is the network diameter and n the number of processes.
Keywords: Self-stabilization, BFS spanning tree, distributed unfair daemon, stabi-
lization time, round complexity.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of constructing a spanning tree in a self-stabilizing manner. Numer-
ous self-stabilizing spanning tree constructions have been studied until now, e.g., the span-
ning tree may be arbitrary (see [CYH91]), depth-first (see [CD94]), breadth-first (see [CDV09]),
shortest-path [CH09], or minimum [BPRT16]. Deterministic solutions to these problems have
been investigated in either fully identified networks [AKY90], or rooted networks [CD94].
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Here, we deal with rooted connected networks. By “rooted” we mean that one process,
called the root and noted r, is distinguished from the others. All other processes are fully
anonymous. Such networks are something said to be semi-anonymous. We focus on the
construction of a Breadth-First Search (BFS) spanning tree in such a rooted connected
network, i.e., a spanning tree in which the (hop-)distance from any node to the root is
minimum.
The spanning tree construction is a fundamental task in communication networks. In-
deed, spanning trees are often involved in the design of routing [GHIJ14] and broadcast-
ing tasks [BDPV99], for example. Moreover, improving the efficiency of the underlying
spanning tree algorithm usually also implies an improvement of the overall solution.
We consider here the atomic state model introduced by Dijkstra [Dij74], also called the lo-
cally shared memory model with composite atomicity. In this model, the daemon assumption
accepted by the algorithm is crucial since it captures the asynchrony of the system. More
generally, self-stabilizing solutions are also discriminated according to their stabilization time
(usually in rounds) and their memory requirement.
Related Work. There are many self-stabilizing BFS spanning tree constructions in the
literature, e.g., [CYH91, HC92, DIM93, AB98, Joh97, CDV09, CRV11]. Maybe, the first one
has been proposed by Chen et al. [CYH91]. It is proven in the atomic state model under the
central unfair daemon and no time complexity analysis is given. The algorithm of Huang
and Chen [HC92] is proven still in the atomic state model, yet under a distributed unfair
daemon. In [DJ16], the stabilization time of this algorithm is shown to be Θ(n) rounds in the
worst case, where n is the number of processes. Another algorithm, implemented in the link-
register model, is given in [DIM93]. It uses unbounded process local memories. However, it is
shown in [DJ16] that a straightforward bounded-memory variant of this algorithm, working
in the atomic state model, achieves an optimal stabilization time in rounds, i.e., O(D)
rounds where D is the network diameter. In [AB98], Afek and Bremler design a solution for
unidirectional networks in the message-passing model, assuming bounded capacity links. The
stabilization time of this latter algorithm is O(n) rounds. The algorithm given in [CRV11]
has a stabilization time O(D2) rounds, assuming the atomic state model and a distributed
unfair daemon. All aforementioned solutions [CYH91, HC92, DIM93, AB98, CRV11] also
achieve the silent property [DGS99]: a silent self-stabilizing algorithm converges within finite
time to a configuration from which the value of all its communication variables are constant.
Two other non-silent, a.k.a. talkative, self-stabilizing BFS spanning tree constructions have
been proposed in the atomic state model. The algorithm in [CDV09] is proven under the
distributed unfair daemon and has a stabilization time in O(n) rounds. In [Joh97], the
proposed solution assumes a distributed weakly fair daemon and its stabilization time is not
investigated.
Except for [Joh97], in all these aforementioned algorithms, each process has a distance
variable which keeps track of the current level of the process in the BFS tree. Thus, these
BFS spanning tree constructions have a space complexity in Ω(log(D)) bits per process.
In contrast, the solution given in [Joh97] does not compute any distance value (actually,
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the construction is done by synchronizing phases). Consequently, the obtained memory
requirement only depends on local parameters, i.e., Θ(log(δp)) bits per process p, where δp
the local degree of p. In other word, the space complexity of this algorithm is intrinsically
Θ(1) bits per edge. Moreover, the algorithm does not need the a priori knowledge of any
global parameter on the network such as D or n. It is worth noticing that today it is still
the best self-stabilizing BFS spanning tree construction in terms of memory requirement.
Contribution. We fill the blanks in the analysis of the memory-efficient self-stabilizing
BFS spanning tree construction given in [Joh97]. Precisely, we study a slightly modified
(maybe simpler) version of the algorithm. This variant still achieves a memory requirement
in Θ(1) bits of memory per edge. We prove its self-stabilization under the distributed unfair
daemon, the weakest scheduling assumption. Moreover, we establish a stabilization time in
O(D · n2) rounds, where D is the network diameter and n the number of processes.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The computational model is
described in Section 2. A detailed description of the algorithm is given in Section 3. Basic
properties are proven in Section 4. In Section 5, we show that every execution of our
algorithm is fair. Its stabilization time in rounds is analyzed in the Section 6.
2 Model
The chosen computation model is an extension of Dijkstra’s original model for rings to
arbitrary graphs [Dij74]. Consider a symmetric connected graph G(V,E), in which V is a
set of processes and E is a set of symmetric edges. We use this graph to model a distributed
system with n processes, n = |V |. In the graph, the directly connected processes are called
neighbors. Each process v maintains a set of neighbors, denoted as N(v). N [v] = N(v)∪{u}
denotes the set of closed neighbors. A process state is defined by its variable values. A
configuration of the system is a set of process states.
The proposed self-stabilizing algorithm consists of a set of rules. Each rule has two parts:
the guard and the action. The guard of a rule is a boolean function of the process’s own
state and the state of its neighbors. the action of a rule is a sequence of updating the value
of the process variables. If a rule guard on the process v is verified in the configuration c,
we say that v is enabled at c. During a computation step, several enabled processes (at least
one) execute a single enabled rule. The algorithm designed ensure that at most one rule
is enabled on any process at any configuration. An execution is a sequence of consecutive
computations steps (c1, c2, ... , cn, ... ).
A set of configuration A is closed if any computation step from a configuration of A reaches
a configuration of A. A configuration set A2 is an A1-attractor, if A2 is closed and all
executions starting from a configuration of A1, has a configuration of A2.
An algorithm self-stabilizes to L if and only if L is an A0-attractor (A0 being the set of
configurations).
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Round complexity. The round notion is used to measure the time complexity. The first
round of a computation e = c1, ..., cj, ... is the minimal prefix e1 = c1, ..., cj, such that every
enabled process in c1 either executes a rule or is neutralized during a computation step of
e1. A process u is neutralized during a computation step if u is disabled in the reached
configuration.
Let e′ be the suffix of e such that e = e1e′. The second round of e is the first round of e′,
and so on.
The stabilization time is the maximal number of rounds needed by any computation from
any configuration to reach a legitimate configuration.
3 Algorithm Specification
We present an anonymous algorithm that builds a BFS spanning tree. Angluin [Ang80]
has shown that no deterministic algorithm can construct a spanning tree in an anonymous
(uniform) network. The best that can be proposed is a semi-uniform deterministic algorithm,
as ours, in which, all processes except one execute the same code. We call r, the distinguished
process, the legal root, which will eventually be the root of the BFS tree. dist(u) denoted
the distance of process u to r in the graph.
The algorithm is non-silent: at the end of a tree construction, the legal root initiates a
new tree construction. The algorithm builds 0-colored and 1-colored BFS spanning tree
alternately. The color is used to distinguish the processes of the tree from those that are not
part of the tree: inly the processes in the current tree have the tree color, named : r color.
On of the difficulty to build a BFS tree without using a distance variable is to ensure that
the path of each process to r in the tree is minimal. Once the system is stabilized, The trees
are built in phases: during the kth phase, all processes at a distance of k from r join the
current tree (by choosing a process at a distance k−1 from r as parent) Once r has detected
the end of a phase it initiates the next phase.
Another difficulty to not having a “distance” variable is to break cycle. A process u in a
cycle that does not have the r color detects a conflict if one of its neighbors has the r color
but also a specific status, named Power. Hence cycles are broken but not branches of the
r-tree.
There are two major error handling tasks: one is to break the cycles, the other is to remove
the illegal branches. The illegal roots detect their abnormal situation and take an Erroneous
status. The children of an Erroneous process become Erroneous illegal root. Finally, the
Erroneous detached processes recover (changing their status to Idle).
We have 2 sets of rules : the rules RC1-RC6 designed to ensure the illegal trees destruction,
and to break cycles are detailed in subsection 3.2; the rules R1-R7 designed to ensure the
tree constructions, presented in subsection 3.3. The following subsection presents the shared
variables.
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3.1 Shared Variables
Each process v maintains the following variables (X.u denotes the value of X inu and X.Y.u
denotes the value of X in process Y.u):
• TS.u : The parent pointer pointing to one of its neighbors or containing ⊥. TS
variables maintain the BFS tree structure in a distributed manner. More precisely,
when the system is stabilized, if u 6= r then dist(u) > dist(TS.u).
• P.u : The parent pointer pointing to one of its neighbors or containing ⊥. When the
system is stabilized, if P.u 6=⊥ then P.u = TS.u. The variable P is used to inform
P.u that the subtree construction rooted at u is terminated or not - if at end of a
phase, u has no child, (i.e., no u’s neighbor has chosen u as parent), then the subtree
construction rooted at u is done.
• C.u: The color which takes value from the set {0, 1}. Once the system stabilizes,
the processes in the current tree have r color = C.r while other processes have the
complement of r color.
• S.u : The status which takes value from the set {Idle,Working, Power,WeakE, StrongE}.
WeakE and StrongE status are used during the error recovering process. Process u
has an Erroneous status if it has the WeakE or StrongE status.
Only processes having the Power status can have new children. Once the system sta-
bilizes, the processes at a distance of k − 1 from r only will acquire the Power status
during the kth phase; if the current phase is begun in u subtree and not yet termi-
nated, then u has the Working status. u has the Idle status, if the tree construction
has not reached it (i.e. P.v =⊥), or the current phase has not started or is finished in
u’ subtree.
r can only have the status Power or Working. ph.u : The phase which takes value
from the set {a, b}. The value of S does not indicate if the current phase is terminated
or not. A process in the tree is Idle when it has completed or has not started the
current phase. In order to distinguish between these two cases, we use the phase vari-
able. If the phase value of an Idle process is the same as that of its parent, then the
Idle process has finished the current phase. Otherwise, it has not initiated the current
phase.
The root r maintains the same variables, except P and TS: r does not have a parent. And
S.r can only have the value Power, Working or StrongE.
The size of P and TS of a process u is log(δu) where δu is the degree of v. The color, status,
and phase variables have a constant size (total 5 bits). Thus, the space complexity of the
shared variables on u is 2 · log(δu) + 5 bits (i.e., O(1) bits per edge).
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1,I,− 1,I,−
0,P,−0,P,−
legal root
1,E,−1,I,−
0,W,− 0,W,−
1,I,− 1,I,− legal root
1,I,−1,I,−
RC5
Before RC5 After RC5
Figure 1: Cycle Elimination.
3.2 Recovering Rules
A distributed system has an unpredictable initial state. Initially, the parent pointers may
point to any neighbor or ⊥. Thus, illegal trees (trees whose roots are not r) and cycles
(paths without a root) may exist in the initial state.
Definition 1 (Cycle Path) A series of processes u1, u2, ... ul is a cycle path if P.ui = ui−1
for 1 < i ≤ l and P.u1 = ul.
Processes in cycle will detect their situation with the help of their neighbors. Once a conflict
detected by a process, it becomes an illegal Erroneous root (rule RC4 or RC5), hence its
cycle is transformed into an illegal tree. A process having a parent assumes that it is in
the legal tree and its color is equal to r color (even if it is inside a cycle). Based on this
assumption, it detects a conflict when a Power neighbor does not have its color (both cannot
be inside the legal tree). An example of such a destruction is given in Figure 1.
−,E,−
−,E,−
−,W,− −,W,−
RC6
RC5 RC5
−,W,−
−,W,− −,W,−
−,E,−
RC5
−,E,− −,E,−
−,I,−
−,E,− RC6
RC6 RC6
−,I,−
−,I,−
−,I,−
−,I,−
−,W,−
−,W,−−,W,−
−,W,− RC5
Figure 2: Illegal Tree Elimination.
The illegal roots detect the abnormal situation and take WeakE status by a RC5 move.
Their children take the WeakE status and quits their tree by a RC5 move. Finally, the
detached (i.e., without a parent and child) Erroneous processes are recovered: they change
their status by executing RC2 or RC6. The repetition of detaching and recovering processing
will correct all processes inside the illegal trees (see an example in Figure 2).
If a process u 6= r has in its closed neighborhood two processes having the Power status
but not the same color then u detects a strong conflict : the both process cannot be in the
legal tree. Therefore, u takes the StrongE status (rule RC4). All Power neighbors of a
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process having the StrongE status verify the predicate PowerFaulty : they have to change
their status (rule RC1, RC3, RC4, or RC5). When the root detects a conflict it takes the
StrongE status (rule RC2). The root detects a conflict if one of its neighbors has the Power
status but not the r color or r has not any child.
A Faulty process may become an illegal Erroneous root by execution the rule RC5. A
process is Faulty if it does not have the right color, the right status, or the right phase
according to its parent’s state. More specifically, an non-faulty process has not parent or it
parent has an Erroneous status. In the other cases, an non-faulty process, u verifies the 6
following properties. (1) u has not an Erroneous status. (2) u has the same color as P.u.
(3) u status is Idle if P.u has not the Working status. (4) u has the same phase value as
P.u if they have the same status. (5) u has the same phase as P.u if u has the Power status.
(6) u is childless, and u has the same phase value as P.u if P.u has the Power status.
The following predicates are used to define the recovering guard rules:
• Child.u = {v ∈ N(u)|P.v = u} children set contains the u’s neighbor direct descendent
of u in the tree under construction.
• StrongConflict(u) ≡ (S.u 6= StrongE) ∧
(∃(w, v) ∈ (N [u], N [u]) | (C.v 6= C.u) ∧ (S.w = S.v = Power))
The process u has two closed neighbors v and w that do not have the same color but
both of them have the Power status. Moreover u has not the StrongE status.
• Conflict(u) ≡ [(u 6= r) ∧ (P.u 6=⊥) ∧ (∃v ∈ N(u) | (S.v = Power) ∧ (C.v 6= C.u))]
∨ [(u = r) ∧ (S.u 6= StrongE) ∧
(∃v ∈ N(u) | (S.v = Power)∧((C.v 6= C.u)∨(Child.u = ∅)))]
The process u 6= r has a neighbor v which has not the u color, and v has the Power
status; moreover u has a parent . The root has a neighbor v which does not have
r color, and v has the Power status or the root has not any child.
• Detached(u) ≡ (Child.u = ∅) ∧ ((P.u =⊥)∨(u = r))∧(S.u 6= Power) u has no parent
or it is the root, u has no child and it cannot gain a child.
• StrongEReady(u) ≡ ((S.u = StrongE) ∧ (∀v ∈ N(u) | S.v 6= Power))
• PowerFaulty(u) ≡ (S.u = Power) ∧ (∃v ∈ N(u) | S.v = StrongE)
• Faulty(u) ≡ (u 6= r) ∧ (P.u 6=⊥)∧ (S.P.u /∈ Erroneous)∧
( [ S.u ∈ Erroneous ] ∨
[ (C.u 6= C.P.u) ] ∨
[ (S.P.u 6= Working) ∧ (S.u 6= Idle) ] ∨
[ (S.P.u = S.u) ∧ (ph.u 6= ph.P.u) ] ∨
[ (S.u = Power) ∧ (ph.u 6= ph.P.u) ] ∨
[ (S.P.u = Power)∧ ( (Child.u 6=⊥) ∨ (ph.u 6= ph.P.u) ) ] )
• IllegalRoot(u) ≡ (u 6= r) ∧ (P.u =⊥)∧ ¬Detached(u) u is not the legal root, it has
not parent but it has a child or it has the Power status (so it may get children).
• IllegalLiveRoot(u) ≡ IllegalRoot(u) ∧ (S.u /∈ Erroneous) u is an illegal root and its
does not have an Erroneous status.
7
• IllegalChild(u) ≡ (u 6= r) ∧ (P.u 6=⊥)∧ (S.P.u ∈ Erroneous) u has an Erroneous
parent.
• Isolated(u) ≡ (S.u ∈ {WeakE,Working})∨ StrongEReady(u)
Algorithm 1 Rules for recovering on r.
RC1 : ¬Conflict(r) ∧ PowerFaulty(r) ∧ QuietSubTree(r) → S.r := Working;
RC2 : Detached(r) ∧ StrongEReady(r) → S.r := Working;
RC3 : Conflict(r) → S.r := StrongE;
Algorithm 2 Rules for recovering on u 6= r.
RC4 : StrongConflict(u) → S.u := StrongE; P.u :=⊥;
RC5 : ¬StrongConflict(u) ∧
(Conflict(u) ∨ Faulty(u) ∨ PowerFaulty(u) ∨
IllegalLiveRoot(u) ∨ IllegalChild(u))
→ S.u := WeakE; P.u :=⊥;
RC6 : Detached(u) ∧ Isolated(u) ∧
( ∀v ∈ N(u) we have (C.v = C.u) ∨ (S.v 6= Power) ) → S.u := Idle;
3.3 Tree construction rules
The rules R1 to R7 have been designed to ensure the tree constructions. A R1 move initiates
the tree constructions; a R2 move initiates a phase. R4 and R5 moves propagate the phase
wave from r to the processes in tree. processes joint the legal tree by a R3 move. R6 and
R7 move propagates backward to r the ending of the current phase.
In the beginning of the kth phase, all processes in the tree take Working status and r’s
phase value (by a R4 move), except the leaves (processes at a distance of k−1 from r) which
take Power status (by a R5 move). All processes at a distance of k from r join the tree by
choosing a Power status neighbor as a parent (update their P and TS variables, but they
also take the phase value and color of the new parent) by a R3 move. The processes with
Power status will finish the kth phase (change their status to Idle) when the current phase
is over in their neighborhood: all their neighbors are in the tree (they have r color) by a R6
or R7 move. The Working processes will finish the phase when their children have finished
the current phase (they are Idle and have the same phase value as them) by a R6 or R7
move. Figure 3 illustrates the computation step done during the 3rd phase of a 0-colored
tree construction. A process state is represented by a triplet: its color, its status, its phase,
and a arrow to its parent if the process has a parent.
The rule R1 initiates a tree construction. r changes its color and initiates the first phase (by
taking the Power status). When the kth phase is over (i.e., all processes inside the legal
tree are Idle and have the same phase as r’s one), r initiates the k + 1 phase by executing
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0,P,b
0,W,b legal root
0,W,b
0,W,b
R4
phase is begun and not finished
0,I,b
0,I,b
R6
R5
phase has not begun phase is complete
0,W,b legal root
R6R7R5
0,I,b
phase is begun and not finished
R7
0,I,b
0,I,b
0,I,b 0,I,b phase is completephase has not begun
After the execution of R3, R4, R5, R6, and R7 moves.
0,I,b
0,P,b
0,W,b
0,P,b
0,I,a
0,W,b 0,W,b
0,I,a
0,I,a
0,I,a
0,W,b 0,W,b
0,I,b
0,I,b
R3
1,I,a 1,I,b
R3
Figure 3: A computation step during the 3rd phase of a 0-colored tree construction
R2: r changes its phase value. When the subtree rooted at a process, u is complete (i.e.,
its Child set is empty), u sets its P variable to ⊥ by executing R7. Thus, when r becomes
childless (child.r = ∅), the tree construction is complete. The tree is stored locally in the
TS variables. r initiates a new tree construction, by a R1 move. A complete 0-colored tree
construction is presented in Figure 4.
We define some predicates which are used in the algorithm.
• Ok(u) ≡ ¬StrongConflict(u) ∧ ¬Conflict(u) ∧ ¬PowerFaulty(u) ∧ ¬Faulty(u) ∧
¬IllegalRoot(u) ∧ ¬IllegalChild(u)
The rules RC1, RC4, RC5, and RC3 are disabled on u.
• QuietSubTree(u) ≡ ( ∀v ∈ Child.u, (S.v = Idle) ∧ (ph.v = ph.u) )
All children of u have finished the current phase (i.e. they are Idle and have the same
phase value as u).
• EndFirstPhase(u) ≡ (S.u = Power) ∧ QuietSubTree(u) ∧ ( ∀v ∈ N(u), C.v = C.u )
If u has the Power status, and all its neighbors has its color then u has terminated
the current phase.
• EndPhase(u) ≡ (S.u = Working) ∧ QuietSubTree(u)
u has finished the current phase (not its first one so u has not the Power status).
• EndLastPhase(u) ≡ (Child.u = ∅) ∧ ( EndFirstPhase(u) ∨ EndPhase(u) )
u has finished a phase and u is childless. The current tree construction is terminated
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R1
Figure 4: An 0-colored tree construction
in the subtree of u.
• EndIntermediatePhase(u) ≡ (Child.u 6= ∅) ∧ ( EndFirstPhase(u) ∨ EndPhase(u) )
u has finished a phase and it still has some children. The tree construction is not over
in its subtree.
• Connection(u, v) ≡ (Detached(u) ∧ (Isolated(u) ∨ (S.u = Idle)) ∧
(v ∈ N(u)) ∧ (C.v 6= C.u) ∧ (S.v = Power)
u is a Detached process that has or may take the Idle status. v has Power status and
does not have the color of u. Therefore, u assumes that v is a leaf of the current legal
tree. Thus, u may choose v as parent and take its color. For error-recovering purpose,
u verifies the predicate Ok(u).
• NewPhase(u) ≡ (P.u 6=⊥) ∧ QuietSubTree(u) ∧ (S.u = Idle) ∧ (ph.u 6= ph.P.u)
v’s parent has begun a phase, but u has not. More precisely, u is an Idle process, and
u’s phase differs from its parent phase. Its parent has the Working status (otherwise
Faulty(u) or IllegalChild(u) is verified),
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Algorithm 3 Rules on r for the tree construction.
R1 : Ok(r) ∧ EndLastPhase(r) ∧ (∀v ∈ N(u) | (S.v 6= StrongE))
→ C.r := (C.r + 1)mod2; S.r := Power;
R2 : Ok(r) ∧ EndIntermediatePhase(r)
→ r changes its phase value; S.r := Working;
Algorithm 4 Rules on u 6= r for the tree construction.
R3 : Ok(u) ∧ Connection(u, v)
→ C.u := C.v ; ph.u := ph.v ; S.u := Idle ; P.u := v ; TS.u := v;
R4 : Ok(u) ∧ NewPhase(u) ∧ Child.u 6= ∅ → ph.u := ph.P.u ; S.u := Working;
R5 : Ok(u) ∧ NewPhase(u) ∧ Child.u = ∅ ∧ (∀v ∈ N(u) we have (S.v 6= StrongE))
→ ph.u := ph.P.u ; S.u := Power;
R6 : Ok(u) ∧ EndIntermediatePhase(u) → S.u := Idle;
R7 : Ok(u) ∧ P.u 6=⊥ ∧ EndLastPhase(u) → S.u := Idle ; P.u :=⊥;
4 Basic properties
4.1 Algorithm Liveness
Observation 1 If StrongConflict(r) is verified then Conflict(r) is also verified.
r cannot verified the predicates Faulty, IllegalRoot, and IllegalChild.
Theorem 1 In any configuration, at least one process is enabled.
Proof: We consider five possible global configurations :
1 If a process u1 6= r verifying the predicate StrongConflict(u1), Conflict(u1), Faulty(u1)
or PowerFaulty(u1) then u1 is enabled (rule RC4 or RC5).
2 All processes except r verify the predicates ¬StrongConflict, ¬Conflict, ¬Faulty, and
¬PowerFaulty. r verifies the predicate Conflict or PowerFaulty. If r verifies the predicate
Conflict(r) then the rule RC3 is enabled at r. If r verifies the predicates ¬Conflict(r) and
PowerFaulty(r) then QuietSubTree(r) is verified as all children of r verify the predicate
¬Faulty. So the rule RC1 is enabled at r.
3 All processes verify the predicates ¬StrongConflict, ¬Conflict, ¬Faulty, and ¬PowerFaulty.
There is an illegal tree: there is at least a process u 6= r verifying IllegalRoot(u).
3.1 If the root of an illegal tree does not have an Erroneous status then this process can
execute the rule RC5. It verifies the predicate IllegalLiveRoot.
3.2 The roots of an illegal tree have an Erroneous status. All children of an illegal root
are enabled (they verify the IllegalChild predicate).
4 All processes verify the predicates ¬StrongConflict, ¬Conflict, ¬Faulty, ¬PowerFaulty,
¬IllegalLiveRoot, and ¬IllegalChild. There is a process having an Erroneous status.
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4.1 S.r = StrongE. We have Child(r) = ∅ as no process verifies IllegalChild, and no r
neighbor has the Power status as all processes verify ¬PowerFaulty. So, r may execute
the rule RC2.
4.2 Let u4 6= r be a node having an Erroneous status. We have (P.u4 =⊥) as u4 is not
faulty; Child.u4 = ∅ as there is not illegal tree. If S.u4 = StrongE then no u4 neighbor
has the Power status (as all processes verify ¬PowerFaulty). So, u4 may execute the rule
RC6 or the rule R3.
5 No process has an Erroneous status. All processes verify the predicate Ok(u).
5.1 The legal tree has a Working leaf. This leaf holds the R7 or R1 guard.
5.2 There is an Idle process u2 on the legal tree that does not have the same phase value
as its parent’s one. This process verifies the R4 or the R5 guard because the predicate
QuietSubTree is verified by u2’s children as u2’s children are non-faulty and no u2’s
neighbor has an Erronneous status.
5.3 The legal tree has a Power process u5 having a neighbor v5 which does not have its
color. As, there is not conflict, P.v5 = ⊥ and S.v5 6= Power; as there is not illegal tree
Child.v5 = ∅. v5 has the Idle or the Working status as no process has an Erroneous
status. v5 verifies the R3 guard.
5.4 The legal tree has a Power process u5 whose all neighbors have its color. u5 verifies
the R1, R2, R6, or R7 guard; because the predicate QuietSubTree is verified by u5’s
children as u5’s children are non-faulty.
5.5 The legal tree does not have a Power process, neither a Working leaf. The legal
tree has Working processes (at least the legal root). Beside every branch of the legal tree
ends by an Idle leaf. Thus, the legal tree has a Working process whose all its children
are Idle (these children have its phase otherwise see 5.2). This process verifies the R2 or
R6 guard.
2
4.2 Faultless processes
Lemma 1 Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching c2. The predicate ¬Faulty is closed
on process u. Faulty(u) is not verified in c2 if u executes a rule during cs.
Proof: Faulty(r) is never verified. In the sequel u 6= r
If u executes a recovering rule (i.e. the rule RC4, RC5, or RC6) then Faulty(u) is false in c2
because P.u =⊥.
If P.u =⊥ in c2 then Faulty(u) is false. So in the sequel, we name v the process P.u in
the configuration c2. If v executes the rule RC4, RC5, or RC3 then Faulty(u) is false in c2
because S.P.u ∈ Erroneous in c2. As P.u = v in c2; in c1 S.v = Power or u ∈ Child(v).
We conclude that v cannot execute RC6 or RC2 during cs. Assume that v = r executes the
rule RC1 in cs. QuietSubTree(r) is verified in c1, the only tree construction rule that may
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execute u during cs is R3. We conclude that S.u = Idle, ph.u = ph.r and C.u = C.r in c2;
so in c2 Faulty(u) is false. We establish that If v executes a recovering rule (i.e. the rule
RC1, RC2, RC3, RC5, RC4, or RC6) then Faulty(u) is false in c2 .
The last case to study is the one where only tree construction rules are executed by u and v
during cs. Assume that P.u 6= v in c1. So u executes R3 during cs, we conclude that in c1
S.v = Power and C.v 6= C.u; so v does not execute any rule during cs. Therefore, Faulty(u)
is false in c2.
Let us study the subcase where P.u = v in c1 and v executes a tree construction rule
during cs. u cannot execute any tree construction rule during cs, because QuietSubTree(v)
is verified in c1 by hypothesis. If v executes a tree construction rule during cs then Faulty(u)
is false in c2 in regard of tree construction guards and actions.
Let us study the subcase where P.u = v in c1 and u executes a tree construction rule during
cs. v cannot execute any tree construction rule during cs, because QuietSubTree(v) is not
verified in c1. If u executes a tree construction rule during cs then Faulty(u) is false in c2 in
regard of tree construction guards and actions. We conclude that Faulty(u) is not verified
in c2 if u executes a rule during cs.
Assume that u and v do not execute any rule during cs, if Faulty(u) is not verified in c1
then Faulty(u) is not verified in c2.
Therefore the predicate Faulty(u) is closed. 2
4.3 InLegalTree, unRegular and influential processes
A process u verifies inLegalTree if and only if u is in a branch rooted at r whose all its
ascendants and u are not faulty. Moreover S.r should not be StrongE.
A process verifies either the predicate inLegalTree, Detached or unRegular.
Definition 2 (inLegalTree and unRegular processes)
A process u verifies the predicate inLegalTree iff
(u = r), and (S.u 6= StrongE) or
(P.u 6=⊥), inLegalTree is verified by P.u, and ¬Faulty(u)
A process u verifies the predicate unRegular iff ¬Detached(u) and ¬inLegalTree(u)
A PowerParent process u has a descendant (maybe itself) that may take the Power status,
by the execution of a series of R4 and R5 moves.
Definition 3 (PowerParent processes) A process u verifies the predicate PowerParent
iff
• (P.u 6=⊥), (S.u = Idle), (S.P.u = Working) and (ph.u 6= ph.P.u), or
• (P.u 6=⊥), PowerParent(P.u), (S.u = Idle) and (ph.u = ph.P.u)
Let v be a process belonging to Child(u) with u verifying the predicate PowerParent. The
process v verifies the predicate PowerParent or the predicate Faulty.
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Definition 4 (influential processes) A process u verifies the predicate influential iff
(S.u = Power) or PowerParent(u)
Any inLegalTree process is influential after the execution of the rule R2 by the root. No
inLegalTree process is influential after the execution of the rule RC1 or RC2 by the root.
Only r is influential after the execution of the rule R1 by the root.
Lemma 2 Let cs be a computation step from c1 to reach c2 where a process u 6= r executes
a rule. If u is influential in c2 then u executes the rule R5.
Proof: If u executes the rule RC4, RC5, RC6, or R7, in c2, we have P.u =⊥ and S.u 6=
Power, so u is not influential.
If u executes the rule R6 then we have P.u 6=⊥ in c1. Let us name v, P.u, in c1. We have
S.v = Working and ph.v = ph.u, in c1. On v, only the rule RC4, RC5, or RC3 may be
enabled in c1, as Child(v) 6= ∅ and the predicate QuietSubTree(v) is not verified in c1. In
c2, we have S.v 6= Idle and ph.u = ph.v. So u is not influential in c2 as S.u = Idle in c2.
If u executes the rule R4 then u is not influential in c2 as S.u = Working.
If u executes the rule R3 then we have P.u 6=⊥, in c2. Let us name v, P.u in c2. We have
S.v = Power in c1. On v, only the rule RC1, RC4, RC5, or RC3 may be enabled in c1, as the
predicate EndFirstPhase(v) is not verified in c1. In c2, we have S.v 6= Idle and ph.u = ph.v.
So u is not influential in c2 as S.u = Idle in c2. 2
Lemma 3 Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching c2. If during cs, u 6= r becomes
influential then u did not execute any move during cs.
Proof: Assume that u executes a move during cs and u is influential in c2. According to
Lemma 2, u executes the rule R5 during cs. R5 is enabled only on influential process. So u
does become influential during cs. 2
Lemma 4 Let u be a process with u 6= r. Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching
c2. In c1, u is not influential but it is in c2. r executes R2 during cs, and InLegalTree(u) is
verified in c2.
Proof: Assume that in c1, u0 is not influential, but it is in c2. So S.u0 6= Power in c1.
u0 does not execute a rule during cs (Lemma 3). We conclude that PowerParent(u0) is not
verified in c1 but in c2. As u0 does not execute a rule during cs, we must have S.u0 = Idle
and P.u0 6=⊥ in c1.
Base Case. Assume that P.u0 = u1 in c1 with u1 6= r.
Assume that u1 executes a rule during cs. To have PowerParent(u0), we must have S.u1 ∈
{Working, Idle} in c2. As Child(u1) 6= ∅ in c1, u1 would execute the rule R4 or R6. If
u1 had executed R6 then in c1 we would have Ok(u1), S.u1 ∈ {Working, Power} and
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ph.u1 = ph.P.u1. Let us name u2 process P.u1 in c1. During cs, u2 may only execute
the rule RC1, RC2, RC4, or RC5. In c2, we would have P.u1 = u2, ph.u1 = ph.u2 and
S.u2 6= Idle; so PowerParent(u1) would not be verified in c2. If u1 had executed R4 then
PowerParent(u1), and PowerParent(u0) would be verified in c1: a contradiction with the
hypothesis. We conclude that u1 does not execute a rule during cs.
We have S.u1 = Idle and ph.u1 = ph.u0 in c1 otherwise u0 is influential in c1 or u0 is
not influential in c2. Notice that PowerParent(u1) has to be verified in c2 to ensure that
PowerParent(u0) is verified in c2; but PowerParent(u1) is not verified in c1 as PowerParent(u0)
is not verified in c1.
By induction, we establish that a finite series of processes u0, u1, · · · , ul verifying the
following properties exists: PowerParent(ui) is not verified, P.ui = ui+1, S.ui = Idle, and
ph.ui = ph.ui+1 for 0 ≤ i < l in c1. We have either P.ul =⊥, ul = ui with i < l, or ul = r in
c1.
First case, we have P.ul =⊥ or ul = ui with i < l. According to the base case paragraph,
processes ui with 0 ≤ i ≤ l do not execute any action during cs. We conclude that u0 is not
influential in c2.
Last case ul = r. During cs, processes ui with 0 ≤ i < l do not execute any action (see base
case paragraph). So inLegalTree(ui) is verified in c2. Only if r executes R2, PowerParent(ui)
is verified for 0 ≤ i < l in c2. 2
Corollary 1 Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching c2. If during cs, v becomes
influential then C.v = C.r in c2.
4.4 UnSafe processes
A unSafe process u verifies the predicate inLegalTree, u may have influential descendants,
and u may execute RC4 or RC5. After this move, its descendants have become unRegular.
Definition 5 (insideLegalTree and unSafe processes)
A process u verified the predicate insideLegalTree(u) iff
inLegalTree(u), (S.u 6= Power), and (Child.u 6= ∅).
A process u verified the predicate unSafe iff
insideLegalTree(u) and (∃v ∈ N(u) | C.v 6= C.u and v is influential).
The current execution may reach a configuration where an unSafe process u may verified the
guard of the rule RC4 or RC5, and the predicate insideLegalTree(u).
Lemma 5 ¬unSafe(u) is a closed predicate.
Proof: Let cs be a computation step from c1 to c2.
If r executes the rule R1 or RC3 during cs then no process verifies the predicate unSafe in
c2 as no process verifies the Predicate insideLegalTree.
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In the sequel, we assume that r does not execute the rule R1 or RC3 during cs (i.e. r does
not change its color).
Becoming influential. Any process becoming influential during the step cs as the r’s color
in c1, and in c2 named r color (Corollary 1).
Becoming insideLegalTree. Assume that in c1, insideLegalTree(u) is not verified but it
is verified in c2. We conclude that u has executed the rule R2 or R6 during cs; so in c1, u
verifies the predicates inLegalTree(u) and EndFirstPhase(u). Therefore in c1, u and all u
neighbors have the same color as r, r color. A neighbor of u, v 6= r, would have not the color
r color in c2 if v has executed the rule R3 during cs. In c1, v would verify the predicate
Connection(v, w) but also the predicate StrongConflict(v). We conclude that during cs, v
could not execute the rule R3; so any neighbor of u, v, verifies (C.v = r color = C.u) in c2.
So ¬unSafe(u) is verified in c2.
Becoming unsafe. Assume that in c1, unSafe(u) is not verified but it is verified in c2.
The paragraph ”becoming insideLegalTree” establishes that InsideLegalTree(u) has to be
verified in c1 to have unSafe(u) in c2. Let v be a neighbor of u that is influential in c2 and
C.v 6= C.u, in c2. Such a process exists because unSafe(u) is verified in c2. We have v 6= r
as InsideLegalTree(u) is verified in c2. The paragraph ”becoming influential” establishes
that if the process v becomes influential during cs then C.v = C.u = r color at c2. So, v is
influential in c1. Hence, v cannot execute R3 during cs, so it cannot change its color. Either
C.v 6= C.u in c1 and unSafe(u) is verified in c1 or C.v = C.u in c2 and unSafe(u) is not
verified in c2.
We conclude that no process becomes unSafe during cs. 2
Corollary 2 Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching c2. Let u be a process that is
not unRegular and influential in c1 but it is in c2. We have C.u = C.r in c2.
Proof: Let u be a process that becomes unRegular and influential during cs. Lemma 4
establishes that if a process u becomes influential during cs then u is not unRegular in c2.
So u is influential and inLegalTree in c1. Therefore in c1, we have C.r = C.u = r color.
R1 is not enabled at c1 because inLegalTree(u) is verified. so r has the same color r color in
c1 and in c2. In c1, R3 is not enabled on u because it is influential; so u has the same color,
r color, in c1 and c2. 2
Lemma 6 Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching c2 where no unSafe process executes
RC4, RC5, or RC3. All unRegular and influential processes in c2 were also unRegular and
influential processes in c1.
Proof: Assume that u0 becomes unRegular and Influential during cs.
If r is unRegular then r is not influential as S.r = StrongE. So u0 is not r. Lemma 4
establishes that if a process u0 6= r becomes influential during cs then u0 is not unRegular
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in c2. So u0 6= r is influential and inLegalTree in c1. Therefore P.u0 6=⊥, and ¬Faulty(u0)
in c1. According to Lemma 1, we have ¬Faulty(u0) in c2. We name u1 = P.u0 in c1. In c1,
we have S.u1 6= Power as ¬Faulty(u0) and influential(u0) are verified.
By induction, we will build an infinite series of distinct processes u1, u2, · · · verifying ui 6= r,
P.ui = ui+1, insideLegalTree(ui) for i > 1 in c1. As the number of processes is finite : we
will establish a contradiction.
Either u0 executes no rule during cs or u0 executes the rule R5 (according to Lemma 2).
So P.u0 = u1 in c2. We conclude that inLegalTree(u1) is true in c1 but not in c2. In c1,
insideLegalTree(u1) is true (we have S.u1 6= Power and Child(u1) 6= ∅). By hypothesis, u1
does not execute the rule RC4, RC5 or RC3 during cs.
If u1 = r then r would execute the rule RC3 during cs because inLegalTree(u1) is true in
c1 but not in c2. We conclude that u1 6= r. By definition of insideLegalTree(u1), we have
P.u1 6=⊥ (as u1 6= r) and ¬Faulty(u1) in c1. Let us name u2 = P.u1 in c1. In c1, we have
S.u2 6= Power as ¬Faulty(u1) and Child(u1) 6= ∅ are verified. We also have inLegalTree(u2)
as inLegalTree(u1) is verified. By hypothesis, u1 does not execute the rule RC4, or RC5
during cs. The rule R3 or R7 are disabled at u1 in c1. So P.u1 = u2 in c2. We conclude
that inLegalTree(u2) is true in c1 but not in c2. In c1, insideLegalTree(u2) is true (we have
S.u2 6= Power and Child(u2) 6= ∅).
By induction, we build an infinite series of processes u1, u2, · · · verifying ui 6= r, P.ui =
ui+1, insideLegalTree(ui) for i > 1 in c1. If it exists i 6= j such that ui = uj then
insideLegalTree(ui) is not verified. So all processes are distinct in the infinite series of
processes: there is a contradiction. 2
5 Proof of execution Fairness
5.1 Inside-safe executions
Definition 6 (inside-safe execution) An execution where insideLegalTree processes exe-
cute only the rules R1 to R7 and the number of processes verifying the predicate Faulty stays
unchanged is an inside-safe execution.
Lemma 7 Any execution has an inside-safe suffix. The predicate (¬influential ∨ inLegal-
Tree) is closed along an inside-safe suffix.
Proof: Let e be an execution.
The predicate ¬Faulty(u) is closed (Lemma 1). So along e the number of processes verifying
the predicate Faulty can only decrease. We conclude that e has a suffix where this number
does not change.
The rules RC6, RC1 and RC2 are disabled on insideLegalTree processes.
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A process verifying the predicate insideLegalTree cannot verified the predicates PowerFaulty,
IllegalLiveRoot and IllegalChild. Hence, an insideLegalTree process u executes the rule RC4,
RC5 or RC3 at c1 only if u verifies StrongConflict or Conflict at c1 (i.e. u is unSafe at c1).
In the reached configuration c2, after a RC4, RC5 or RC3 move by u we have P.u =⊥ and
S.u ∈ Erroneous; so u is not unsafe in c2. The predicate ¬Unsafe is closed (Lemma 5).
We conclude that any process u executes at most one time the rule RC4, RC5 or RC3 at a
configuration where insideLegalTree(u) is verified.
So e has a inside-safe suffix, named e′. Lemma 6 establishes that the predicate (¬influential
∨ inLegalTree) is closed during any inside-safe execution. 2
The negation of the predicate (¬influential(u) ∨ inLegalTree(u)) is the predicate (influential(u)
∧ unRegular(u)).
A process is silent during an execution if it does not execute any rule during this execution.
Lemma 8 Let e1 be an inside-safe execution e1 has a suffix where influential and unRegular
processes are silent.
Proof: An influential process is not influential after any move except R5 (Lemma 2).
According the R5 guard and action, the executed rule after a R5 move by a process cannot
be R5.
So during e1, a process staying forever influential and unRegular executes at most a single
rule (R5). 2
Lemma 9 Let e2 be the inside-safe execution suffix where influential and unRegular pro-
cesses are silent. e2 has a suffix where no process executes RC4 and RC3.
Proof: Let cs be a computation step of e from c1 to c2.
Let u be a process executing RC4 during cs. In c1, two processes of N[u], v1 and v2, have
the Power status and do not have the same color. So one of them, denoted in the sequel
v, verifies the predicate (influential(v) ∧ unRegular(v)) in c1. According to the definition of
e2, v keeps forever it status, so u is disabled along e from c2. We conclude that e contains
at most n steps where a process executes RC4.
Assume that r executes RC3 during cs. first case. in c1, r has a neighbor v1 having the
Power status but not the r’s color. second case. in c1, r has a neighbor v2 having the Power
status and Child.r = ∅ (i.e. no process except r verifies the predicate inLegalTree). So v1
or v2, named v in the sequel, verifies the predicate (influential(v) ∧ unRegular(v)) in c1.
According to the definition of e2, v keeps forever its status, so r is disabled along e from c2.
We conclude that e contains at most one step where r executes RC3. 2
Corollary 3 Let e3 be the inside-safe execution suffix where influential and unRegular pro-
cesses are silent, and no process executes RC4 and RC3. e3 has suffix where the predicates
¬PowerFaulty and S.r 6= StrongE are closed.
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Proof: Let cs be a computation step of e3 from c1 to c2.
Assume that S.r = StrongE in c2. During e3, no process takes the status StrongE. So in
c1, we have S.r = StrongE. The predicate S.r 6= StrongE is closed along e3.
Assume that PowerFaulty(u) is verified in c2. During e3, no process takes the status
StrongE. So, u has a neighbor, v, having the StrongE status in c1. u cannot execute
the rule R1 or R5 to take the Power status during cs according to the rule guards. We
conclude that in c1, S.u = Power: PowerFaulty(u) is verifies in c1. 2
Lemma 10 Let e3 be the inside-safe execution suffix where influential and unRegular pro-
cesses are silent, no process executes RC4 and RC3, and the predicates ¬PowerFaulty and
S.r 6= StrongE are closed. e3 has suffix where r does not execute the rule RC1 and RC2.
Proof: Let cs be a step of e3 from c1 to reach c2 where r executes a rule. If r executes
RC1 or RC2 then the predicate PowerFaulty(r) or the predicate S.r = StrongE is verified in
c1. In the sequel, we will prove that these both predicates are no verified after any r move.
If r executes the rule RC1, R2, or RC2 then in c2, we have S.r = Working. So, ¬PowerFaulty(r)
and S.r 6= StrongE are verified in c2; these both predicates stay verified along the execution
e3 from c2 (Corollary 3). So RC1 and RC2 are not executed along e3 from c2.
If r executes the rule R1 then in c1, ¬PowerFaulty(r) and S.r 6= StrongE are verified. These
both predicates stay verified along the execution e3 from c2 (Corollary 3). So RC1 and RC2
are not executed along e3 from c2.
We conclude that r executes at most one time the rule RC1 and the rule RC2 along e3. 2
5.2 Safe executions
Definition 7 (safe execution) A safe execution is an execution where insideLegalTree pro-
cesses execute only the rules R1 to R7, influential and unRegular processes are silent, the
predicate ¬PowerFaulty is closed and the rule RC1, RC4, RC3 and RC2 are never executed.
A safe execution is an inside-safe execution.
Corollary 4 Any execution has a safe suffix.
Lemma 11 Let e be a safe execution e has a suffix where no process executes the rule RC5
at a configuration where it verifies Conflict and inLegalTree.
Proof: Assume that a process u 6= r executes the rule RC5 during the step cs from c1
to c2 along e; moreover, in c1 we have inLegalTree(u). So u has a neighbor v verifying
S.v = Power and C.v = r color (r color being the color of r in c1). According to the
definition of a safe-execution, v is silent along e because v verifies the predicates influential
and unRegular. After u move, u verifies P.u =⊥. Assume that along e from c2 there is a
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computation step from c3 to c4 where (C.u = r color)∨ (P.u =⊥) is verified in c3 but not in
c4. During cs, u must have execute the rule R3 to choose as a parent a process having the
color r color. In c3, u has a neighbor w verifying C.w = r color and S.w = Power, u verifies
the predicate StrongConflict not the R3 guard (because S.v = Power and C.v = r color).
So u never executes the rule R3 to set its color to r color. We conclude that u verifies forever
(C.u = r color) ∨ (P.u =⊥).
Assumes that u verifies the predicate Conflict and inLegalTree in the configuration c3′
reached along e from c2. We have established that C.u = r color in c3′. So u has a neighbor
w verifying C.w = r color and S.w = Power; we conclude that u does not verify the RC5
guard but the RC4 guard because S.v = Power and C.v = r color in c′3.
We conclude that u executes at most one time the rule RC5 at a configuration where it
verifies Conflict and inLegalTree along e. 2
Lemma 12 Let e be a safe execution e has a suffix where no process executes the rule RC5
at a configuration where it verifies PowerFaulty or Faulty.
Proof: Let cs be a step of e from c1. Let u be process u that executes the rule RC5 during
cs.
Assume that u verifies the predicate Faulty or PowerFaulty in c1. After the step cs, u never
verifies the predicate Faulty and the predicate PowerFaulty according to the definition of a
safe execution and Lemma 1. So it never executes again RC5 at a configuration where these
predicates are verified. 2
Lemma 13 Let e be a safe execution e has a suffix where no process executes the rule RC5
at a configuration where it verifies inLegalTree.
Proof: A process u verifying the predicate inLegalTree does not verify the predicate Ille-
galRoot and does not verify the predicate IllegalChild. e has a suffix e1 where no process
verifying PowerFaulty or Faulty executes RC5 (Lemma 12). e1 has a suffix e2 where RC5
is not executed by processes verifying inLegalTree and Conflict (Lemma 11). We conclude
that in e2 no process verifying inLegalTree executes RC5. 2
Lemma 14 Let e1 be a safe execution where no inLegalTree process executes the rule RC5.
e1 has a suffix where the predicate ¬unRegular is closed.
Proof: Along e1, a process u becomes unRegular if during the execution of the rule R3:
u chooses as parent an unRegular process v having the status Power. According to the
definition of safe-execution, v is silent along e. So, the only enabled rule at u after this
move is RC4. We conclude that the process u is silent after its R3 action along e1. As a
process may become unRegular at most one time along e1; e1 has a suffix where the predicate
¬unRegular is closed. 2
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Definition 8 (pseudo-regular executions) A pseudo regular execution is a safe execu-
tion where inLegalTree processes execute only the rules R1 to R7, and the predicate ¬unRegular(u)
is closed.
In the section 6, we established that any execution from a configuration of A4 is pseudo-
regular. A4 is an attractor reached in 16n− 13 rounds.
Lemma 15 Let e2 be a pseudo-regular execution. e2 has a suffix where no process executes
rule RC5.
Proof: Let u be a process executing RC5 along e2 from c1 to reach the configuration c2.
In c1, unRegular(u) is verified. In c2, S.u ∈ Erroneous and P.u =⊥. The next move of u, if
it exists, is the execution of the rule RC6 or R3. Assume that u executes RC6 or R3 at the
configuration c3. Detached(u) is verified in c3. So the predicate ¬unRegular(u) is verified
along e2 from c3 (by definition of e2).
Along e2, a process u executes at most one time the rule RC5. 2
Let e3 be a a pseudo-regular execution where no process executes the rule RC5. S.u /∈
Erroneous is closed along e3. So a process executes at most one time the rule RC6 along
this execution.
5.3 Regular executions
Definition 9 (regular execution) A regular execution is a pseudo-regular execution where
processes execute only the rules R1 to R7, and the predicate ¬unRegular(u) is closed.
Corollary 5 Any execution has a regular suffix.
During a regular execution, the move of a process u 6= r belongs to the language: (R3 R5
(R6R4)∗ R7)∗, and the moves of r belong to the language : (R1 R2∗)∗.
Lemma 16 Let e be a regular execution where a process u never changes its color. The
execution e has a suffix where all processes of N(u) do not change their color.
Proof: Assume that u keep the color co along e. A process changes its color by the
execution of the rule R3 or the rule R1. Let v be a process of N(u). v never verifies
EndFirstPhase(v) if C.v = co along e. So the execution of the rule R3 or R1 by v to take
the color C.v = col is the second to last or the last move of v. Therefore, v changes its color
at most 2 times along e : one to take the color co, and the last one to take the color co. 2
Corollary 6 Let e be a regular execution where a process u never changes its color. The
execution e has a suffix where no process changes its color.
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In the sequel of this section, we study regular executions where no process changes its color.
We will establish that such executions do not exist.
Observation 2 Let exc be a regular execution where no process change its color. There is
no terminal configuration; so at least a process along exc executes infinitely often a rule.
The moves of any process u 6= r belong to the language R5R7 or to the language (R6R4)∗
R7. The moves of r belong to the language R2∗.
Along exc no process joins any Child(u) set.
Lemma 17 Let exc be a regular execution where where no process changes its color. Let
u be a process executing infinitely often a rule along exc. u has forever a child that also
executes infinitely often a rule.
Proof: The moves of u belong to the language (R6R4)∗ if u 6= r or to R2∗. So u changes
its phase value infinitely often (rule R4 or R2). u cannot gain a child. From a configuration
where the rule R4 or R2 are enabled at u, Child(u) is not empty and QuietSubTree(u) is
verified. So at least a process v verifies forever P.v = u and v changes its phase value
infinitely often along exc. 2
Corollary 7 Let exc be a regular execution where no process changes its color. There a
cycle path whose all the processes execute infinitely often a rule.
Theorem 2 Let exc be a regular execution. Along exc every process changes its color in-
finitely often.
Proof: Let exc be a regular execution. Assume that no process changes its color along
exc.
There a cycle path u1, u2, ... ul whose all the processes execute infinitely often a rule along
exc (Corollary 7). As any process ui is not silent along exc; we have S.ui ∈ {Working, Idle}
along exc. In a configuration reached by exc, if S.ui = Idle then S.ui+1 = Idle otherwise
Faulty(ui+1) would be verified (and ui and ui+1 would be silent). So in any configuration
reached by exc, we have S.ui = S.ui+1 with 0 < i < l.
There is a contradiction as no process of the cycle path is enabled at a configuration where
S.ui = S.ui+1 for all 0 < i < l. 2
Every execution of the algorithm has a regular suffix. During a regular execution, every
process changes its color infinitely often (i.e. they execute R3 or R1 rule infinitely often).
At a configuration where R1 or R3 is enabled at u we have ¬unRegular(u).
6 Convergence Time
Lemma 18 The predicate ¬IllegalLiveRoot(u) is closed.
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Proof: There is not creation a new illegal root that does not have an Erroneous status:
• An process that does not have the Power status cannot gain children.
• An process u 6= r without parent cannot take the Power status.
• At time a process sets P to ⊥ it also sets its status to StrongE or WeakE if it has or
may gain children.
2
Theorem 3 Let A0 be the set of configurations. A1 ≡ { ∀ u, ¬Faulty(u) ∧ ¬IllegalLiveRoot(u)
}. is an A0-attractor reached from A0 in one round.
Proof: ¬Faulty(u) is closed (Lemma 1) and ¬IllegalLiveRoot(u) is closed (Lemma 18). So
A1 is closed.
As long as a process u satisfies the Faulty or IllegalLiveRoot predicate, u is enabled (it
verifies the RC4 or RC5 guard). After RC4 or RC5 action by u, we have ¬Faulty(u) ∧
¬IllegalLiveRoot(u). So, after the first round, A1 is reached. 2
6.1 Erroneous processes
Lemma 19 Let c be a configuration where the process u has an Erroneous status. Let e be a
execution from c where u keeps its status more than one round. At the end of the first round
of e from c, Detached(u) is verified and this property stays verified till u has an Erroneous
status.
Proof: Till S.u ∈ Erroneous, no process chooses u as Parent. Let v be a process of
Child(u) in c. We have v 6= r. The rule RC4 or RC5 is enabled at v till S.u ∈ Erroneous.
So v quits Child(u) before the end of the first round from c. We have Child(v) = ∅ at then
end of the first round from c.
If P.u 6=⊥ (we have u 6= r) then RC4 or RC5 is enabled at v. So Detached(u) is verified at
the end of the first round from c. To conclude, we notice that the predicate Detached(u)
∨(S.u /∈ Erroneous) is closed. 2
Lemma 20 Let c be a configuration of A0 where the process S.u = StrongE status. Let e
be a execution from c. Before the end of the second round u has changed its status to Idle.
Proof: Assume that u keeps its status during the first round of e.
The predicate Detached(u) is verified at then end of the first round from c. The predicate
Detached(u) stays verified till S.u = StrongE (Lemma 19).
Till S.u = StrongE, no process in N(u) takes the Power status. Let v be a process of
N(u) verifying S.v = Power in c. The rule RC1, RC4, RC5, RC3 is enabled at v till
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S.u = StrongE. So S.v 6= Power before the end of the first round from c. At the end of the
first round, we have StrongEReady(v); this property stays verified till S.u = StrongE.
During the second round, u is always enabled (R3, RC6, or RC2). So u executes one of this
rule that changes it status to Idle. 2
Lemma 21 Let c be a configuration where the process u has the status WeakE. Let e be a
execution from c. Before the end of the second round, u has changed its status to Idle or to
StrongE.
Proof: We have u 6= r. Assume that u keeps its status during the first round of e. The
predicate Detached(u) is verified at the end of the first round from c and the predicate
Detached(u) stays verified till S.u = WeakE (Lemma 19).
Till S.u = WeakE and Detached(u), one of the rule RC4, RC6 or R3 is enabled on u. So
before the end of the second round, u has changed its status to Idle or StrongE. 2
6.2 Power processes
Lemma 22 Let c be a configuration of A0 where a process u has the Power status. Let e
be an execution from c. Let v be a u neighbor. The predicate C.v = C.u holds along e till u
keeps the Power status.
Proof: On a configuration where S.u = Power and (C.v = C.u), R1 and R3 are not
enabled at v. So till S.u = Power the predicate (C.v = C.u) is closed. 2
Lemma 23 Let c be a configuration of A0 where the process u has the Power status. Let e
be an execution from c where u keeps its status Power during at least a round. At the end
of the first round of e from c, we have {∀v ∈ N(u) | (C.v = C.u) ∨ (S.v ∈ Erroneous)},
this property holds along e till u keeps the Power status.
Proof: Let e be a execution from c where u keeps the status Power during a round starting
at the configuration c. Let v be a process of N(u) verifying (C.v 6= C.u)∧(S.v /∈ Erroneous)
at c. Till ¬Ok(v) is verified, RC4, RC5, RC3 or RC1 is enabled at v. Till both predicates
Ok(v) and (C.v 6= C.u) ∧ (S.v /∈ Erroneous) are verified during this round, Connection(v,
u) is verified. So, R3 is enabled at v if v 6= r. v = r cannot verify the predicates Ok(r) and
(C.r 6= C.u) ∧ (S.r /∈ Erroneous).
We conclude that till (C.v 6= C.u) ∧ (S.v /∈ Erroneous) is verified, v is enabled (rule R3,
RC5, RC4, RC3, or RC1). After the v move, we have (C.v = C.u) ∨ (S.v ∈ Erroneous).
Let v be a process of N(u) verifying (C.v = C.u) ∨ (S.v ∈ Erroneous) at a configuration
c, where S.u = Power. Assume that (C.v 6= C.u) in c, we have (S.v ∈ Erroneous) in
c by hypothesis. Only the rule R3, RC4, RC5 may be enabled at v. We have (C.v =
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C.u) ∨ (S.v ∈ Erroneous) in reached configuration after a move by v. Till S.u = Power
the predicate (C.v = C.u) is closed (Lemma 22). 2
Observation 3 Let c be a configuration of A1. Any Power process u verifies QuietSubTree(u)
otherwise u would have a Faulty child. Any process v verifying the predicate NewPhase ver-
ifies QuietSubTree(v) otherwise v would have a Faulty child.
Theorem 4 Let c be a configuration of A1 where the process u has an Power status. Let e
be a execution from c. Before the end of the 4th round of e from c, u has changed is status
or u has executed the rule R1.
Proof: If u has a neighbor having the status StrongE before or at the end of the third
round then PowerFaulty(u) is verified till S.u = Power. So u changes its status before the
end of 4th round. In the sequel, we study the executions e from c where no u neighbor has
the status StrongE during the first 3 rounds of e.
Assume that u keeps its status Power during the first 3 rounds of e from c. At the end of
the first round, we have {∀v ∈ N(u) | (C.v = C.u) ∨ (S.v ∈ Erroneous)}, this property
holds along e till u keeps the Power status (Lemma 23). Let v1 be a neighbor of u, verifies
C.v1 = C.u in c Till S.u = Power the predicate (C.v1 = C.u) is closed (Lemma 22).
Let v2 be a neighbor of u having the status WeakE at the end of the first round of e from
c. Before the end of the third round, v2 has changed its status to Idle or StrongE (Lemma
21). As no u neighbor has the StrongE status (by hypothesis), before or at the end of the
third round from c of e, a configuration cv2 where C.v2 = C.u is reached. Till S.u = Power
the predicate (C.v2 = C.u) is closed (Lemma 22). Therefore, before or at the end of the
third round from c of e, a configuration c′ where {∀v ∈ N(u) we have (C.v = C.u)} is
reached. From c′, till S.u = Power, we have QuietSubTree(u) (Observation 3). So, from c′
till S.u = Power, u is enabled (RC5, RC4, RC3, R7, R6, R2, or R1). We conclude that u
changes its status before the end of 4th round or u has executed the rule R1. 2
6.3 Unsafe processes
Definition 10 Let A2 be the set of configurations defines as A2 ≡ A1 ∩{∀ u ∈ V , ¬Unsafe(u)}.
In the sequel, we establish that in at most 8n− 8 rounds from a configuration of A1, A2 is
reached along any execution; and A2 is a A1-attractor.
Definition 11 Let c be a configuration of A1.
The predicate PIC(u) on process is defined as PIC(u) ≡ influential(u) ∧ (C.u 6= C.r).
#PICc = |{u | PIC(u) is verified in c. }|.
The predicate PIC PowerParent(u) on process is defined as
PIC PowerParent(u) ≡ PIC(u) ∧ PowerParent(u).
#PIC PowerParentc = |{u | PIC PowerParent(u) is verified in c. }|.
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Lemma 24 Let c1 be a configuration of A1. Let cs be a step from c1 to c2 where r does not
change its color. If the predicate PIC(u) (resp. PIC PowerParent(u)) is verified in c2 then
it is verified in c1 (resp. PIC PowerParent(u)).
Proof: If u becomes influential during cs then C.u = C.r in c2 (Corollary 1, page 15). If
u 6= r changes of color during cs (i.e. v executes R3) then u is not influential in c2. We
conclude that if PIC(u) is verified in c2 then it is verified in c1 as r does not change its color
during cs.
If in c1, S.u = Power is verified then the predicate PowerParent(u) is not verified in c2.
So, if PIC PowerParent(u) is verified in c2 then it is verified in c1.
So #PICc2 ≤ PICc1 and #PIR PowerParentc2 ≤ PIR PowerParentc1 . 2
Lemma 25 Let c1 be a configuration of A1 where #PICc1 > 0. Let e be a execution from
c1. Let c4 be the configuration reached after 4 rounds along e. Assume that during the first 4
rounds of e, r does change its color. If #PICc4 = #PICc1 then #PIC PowerParentc4 <
#PIC PowerParentc1.
Proof: In the proof, we assume that #PICc4 ≥ #PICc1 .
Let cs be a computation step from c to reach c′ belonging to the first 4 rounds of e.
According to Lemma 24, if in c′, we have PIC(u) then PIC(u) is verified in c and in c1.
According to the the hypothesis, any process verifying PIC in c1, verifies this predicate in
any configuration reached during the first 4 rounds of e. According to Lemma 2 (page 14),
the only rule that may execute a process u1 verifying PIC in c1 during the the first 4 rounds
of e is R5. Assume that u1 executes R5 during cs. In c, PowerParent(u1) is verified but not
in c′. According to Lemma 24, we have #PIC PowerParentc4 < #PIC PowerParentc1 .
In the sequel, we study executions e where processes verifying PIC in c1 are silent during
the first 4 rounds.
Assume in c1, there is a process u
2 verifying PIC(u2) ∧ S.u2 = Power : we have
u2 6= r. According to Theorem 4, u2 executes a rule during the first 4 rounds of e. There
is a contraction. We conclude that in c1, we have (PIC(u) =⇒ PIC PowerParent(u)).
As, processes verifying PIC in c1 are silent during the first 4 rounds of e; in any reached
configuration we have (PIC(u) =⇒ PIC PowerParent(u)). So during the first 4 rounds,
no process verifies PowerConflict and Conflict(r) is not verified as any process u verifies
S.u 6= Power ∨ C.u = C.r. Hence, the rule RC3 and RC4 are not executed during the first
4 rounds of e.
Let cs be a computation step from c to c′ belonging to the first 4 rounds of e. If
S.w = StrongE in c′ then S.w = StrongE in c and in c1. Let c2 be the configuration
reached at the end of the 2th round of e from c. According to the Lemma 20 (page 23), in
c2 and during the first round from c2 along e, every process verifies S.w 6= StrongE.
A process u verifying PowerParent(u) as the Idle status so QuietSubTree(u) is verified
as no process is faulty in A1. According to the definition of the predicate PowerParent, in
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c2 there is a process u
2 verifying PIC PowerParent(u2) and ph.P.u2 6= ph.u2. Let v be P.u2
in c2. Till PowerParent(u
2) and ph.P.u2 6= ph.u2 are verified the rules RC1, RC2, RC6, R1,
R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7 are disabled on v. If v executes the rule RC3, RC4, RC5 then
in the reached configuration, we have S.v ∈ Erronneous so PowerParent(u2) is not verified.
Hence, according to Lemma 24, we have #PIC PowerParentc4 < #PIC PowerParentc1 .
So, v does not execute any rule from c2 along e during first 2 rounds. Therefore,
NewPhase(u2) is verified in c2 and during the 3th round of e from c1. Till NewPhase(u
2)
is verified, u2 may execute a rule (RC4, RC5, R4, or R5) because every process verifies
S.w 6= StrongE. The process u2 cannot be silent during the third round of e. We conclude
that at least a process verifying PIC in c1, does a move during the first 4 rounds. So, we
have #PIC PowerParentc4 < #PIC PowerParentc1 . 2
Lemma 26 A2 is a A1-attractor reached in at most 8n− 8 rounds from a configuration of
A1 (i.e. A2 is a A0-attractor reached in at most 8n− 7 rounds from any configuration).
Proof: For any process u, ¬unSafe(u) is a closed predicate (Lemma 5, page 15).
Let c1 be a configuration of A1. Let e be an execution starting at c1. After the execution
of R1, no process is Unsafe as no process verifies insideLegalTree.
In the sequel, we assume that during the first 8n−8 rounds of e, the rule R1 is not executed.
So r does not change its color r color during the first 8n− 8 rounds of e.
In a configuration where no process u verifying PIC(u), no process verifies the predicate un-
Safe (notice that ¬unSafe is a closed predicate). The predicates ¬PIC and ¬PIC PowerParent
are closed along the first 8n− 8 rounds of e (Lemma 24).
convergence part.
Let c be a configuration of A1. V alPICc = #PIC PowerParentc + #PICc. We have
V alPICc ≤ 2n − 2 as PIC(r) is not verified. Let cs be a computation step from c to c′
done during the first 8n − 8 rounds of e. As the predicates ¬PIC and ¬PIC PowerParent
are closed along the first 8n− 8 rounds of e (Lemma 24); we have V alPICc ≥ V alPICc′ .
Let c4 be the configuration reached the end of first 4 rounds of e from c1. According to
Lemma 25, we have V alc4 < V alPICc1 if V alPICc1 > 0.
Let cf be the configuration reached the end of first 8n− 8 rounds of e from c1. So, we have
V alPICcf = 0 (i.e. no process u verifying PIC(u)). We conclude that no process is unSafe
at the end of first 8n− 8 rounds of e from c1. 2
6.4 Influential and unRegular processes
Definition 12 Let A3 be the set of configurations defined as A3 ≡ A2 ∩ { ∀ u, ¬Influential(u)
∨ inLegalTree(u)}.
In the sequel, we establish that in at most 8n− 8 rounds from a configuration of A2, A3 is
reached along any execution; and A3 is a A2-attractor.
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Definition 13 Let c be a configuration of A1.
The predicate PIR(u) on process is defined as PIR(u) ≡ influential(u) ∧ unRegular(u).
#PIRc = |{u | PIR(u) is verified in c. }|.
The predicate PIR PowerParent(u) on process is defined as
PIR PowerParent(u) ≡ PIR(u) ∧ PowerParent(u).
#PIR PowerParentc = |{u | PIR PowerParent(u) is verified in c. }|.
Observation 4 The negation of the predicate (¬influential(u) ∨ inLegalTree(u)) is the pred-
icate PIR(u).
Lemma 27 Let c2 be a configuration of A2. Let cs be a step from c2 to c3. If the pred-
icate PIR(u) (resp. PIR PowerParent(u)) is verified in c3 then it is verified in c2 (resp.
PIR PowerParent(u)).
Proof: According to lemma 6 (page 16) and A2 definition, if a process u verifies PIR(u)
in c3 is also verifies this predicate in c2.
If in c2, S.u = Power is verified then the predicate PowerParent(u) is not verified in c3.
So, if PIR PowerParent(u) is verified in c3 then it is verified in c2.
So #PIRc3 ≤ PIRc2 and #PIR PowerParentc3 ≤ PIR PowerParentc2 . 2
Lemma 28 Let c2 be a configuration of A2 where #PIRc2 > 0. Let e be a execution from
c2. Let c4 be the configuration reached after 4 rounds along e. If #PIRc4 = #PIRc2 then
#PIR PowerParentc4 < #PIR PowerParentc2.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 25.
In the proof, we assume that #PIRc4 = #PIRc2 .
Let cs be a computation step from c to c′ belonging to the first 4 rounds of e. According
to Lemma 27, if in c′, we have PIR(u) then PIR(u) is verified in c and in c2. According to the
the hypothesis, any process verifying PIR in c2, verifies this predicate in any configuration
reached during the first 4 rounds of e. According to Lemma 2 (page 14), the only rule that
may execute a process u1 verifying PIR in c2 during the the first 4 rounds of e is R5. Assume
that u1 executes R5 during cs. In c, PowerParent(u1) is verified but not in c′. According to
Lemma 27, we have #PIR PowerParentc4 < #PIR PowerParentc2 .
In the sequel, we study executions e where processes verifying PIR in c2 are silent during
the first 4 rounds.
Assume in c2, there is a process u
2 verifying PIR(u2) ∧ S.u2 = Power : we have
u2 6= r. According to Theorem 4, u2 executes a rule during the first 4 rounds of e. There
is a contraction. We conclude that in c2, we have (PIR(u) =⇒ PIR PowerParent(u)).
As, processes verifying PIR in c2 are silent during the 4 first rounds of e; in any reached
configuration we have (PIR(u) =⇒ PIR PowerParent(u)). So during the first 4 rounds,
no process verifies PowerConflict and Conflict(r) is not verified as any process u verifies
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S.u 6= Power ∨ C.u = C.r. Hence, the rule RC3 and RC4 are not executed during the first
4 rounds of e.
Let cs be a computation step from c to c′ done during the first 4 rounds of e. If S.w =
StrongE in c′ then S.w = StrongE in c and in c2. Let c3 be the configuration reached at the
end of the 2th round of e from c. According to the Lemma 20 (page 23), in c3 and during
the first round from c3 along e, every process verifies S.w 6= StrongE.
A process u verifying PowerParent(u) as the Idle status so QuietSubTree(u) is verified
as no process is faulty in A1. According to the definition of the predicate PowerParent, in
c3 there is a process u
2 verifying PIR PowerParent(u2) and ph.P.u2 6= ph.u2. Let v be P.u2
in c3. Till PowerParent(u
2) and ph.P.u2 6= ph.u2 are verified the rules RC1, RC2, RC6, R1,
R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7 are disabled on v. If v executes the rule RC3, RC4, RC5 then
in the reached configuration, we have S.v ∈ Erronneous so PowerParent(u2) is not verified.
Hence, according to Lemma 27, we have #PIR PowerParentc4 < #PIR PowerParentc2 .
So, v does not execute any rule during first 2 rounds of e from c3. Therefore, NewPhase(u
2)
is verified in c3 and during the 3th round of e from c2. Till NewPhase(u
2) is verified, u2 may
execute a rule (RC4, RC5, R4, or R5) because every process verifies S.w 6= StrongE. The
process u2 cannot be silent during the third round of e. We conclude that at least a process
verifying PIR in c2, does a move during the first 4 rounds. So, we have #PIR PowerParentc4 <
#PIR PowerParentc2 . 2
Lemma 29 A3 is a A2-attractor reached in at most 8n− 8 rounds from a configuration of
A2. (i.e. A3 is a A0-attractor reached in at most 16n− 15 rounds from any configuration).
Proof: The predicates ¬PIR PowerParent and ¬PIR are closed (Lemma 27).
The sequel of the proof is similar to the convergence part of proof of Lemma 26.
Let c2 be a configuration of A2. V alPIRc = #PIR PowerParentc + #PIRc. We have
V alPIRc ≤ 2n− 2 as PIR(r) is not verified. Let cs be a computation step from c reaching
c′ done during the first 8n− 8 rounds of e. As the predicates ¬PIR and ¬PIR PowerParent
are closed along e (Lemma 27), we have V alPIRc ≥ V alPIRc′ .
Let c4 be the configuration reached the end of first 4 rounds of e from c2. According to
Lemma 28, we have V alPIRc4 < V alPIRc2 if V alPIRc2 > 0.
Let cf be the configuration reached the end of first 8n− 8 rounds of e from c2. So, we have
V alPIRcf = 0. We conclude that no process verifying PIR(u). 2
7 Properties of A4
Lemma 30 Let A4 be the set of configurations. A4 ≡ A3 ∩ { ∀ u, (S.u 6= StrongE) } is
an A3-attractor reached from A3 in 2 rounds (i.e. A4 is a A0-attractor reached in at most
16n− 13 rounds from any configuration).
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Proof: Let c3 be a configuration of A3. Let u be a process verifying in c3 StrongConflict(u).
So two processes of N[u], v1 and v2, has the Power status and do not have the same color.
One of them, denoted v, verifies the predicate (influential(v) ∧ unRegular(v)) in c3. It is
impossible according to the definition of A3. Therefore the rule RC4 is not enabled at any
process in c3.
Assume that in c3, Conflict(r) is verified. first case. in c3, r has a neighbor v3a having the
Power status but not the r’s color. second case. in c1, r has a neighbor v3b having the Power
status and Child.r = ∅ (i.e. no process except r verifies the predicate inLegalTree). So v3a
or v3b, named v in the sequel, verifies the predicate (influential(v) ∧ unRegular(v)) in c3. It
is impossible according to the definition of A3. Therefore the rule RC3 is not enabled in c3.
We conclude that the property (S.u 6= StrongE) is closed in A3.
According to Lemma 20 (page 23), after 2 rounds of any execution from c3, a configuration
of A4 is reached. 2
Lemma 31 Let c4 be a configuration of A4. In c4, the rule RC5 is disabled at any process
verifying the predicate inLegalTree.
Proof: Assume that the rule RC5 is enabled at u a process u verifying inLegalTree(u).
In c4 ∈ A4, u cannot verify one of the following predicates : Faulty(u), PowerFaulty(u),
IllegalLiveRoot(u), IllegalChild(u). So Conflict(u) is verified in c4. So u has a neighbor v ver-
ifying S.v = Power and C.v = r color (r color being the color of r). We have Influential(v)
and ¬inLegalTree(v), in c4. It is impossible according to the definition of A4. 2
Lemma 32 Any execution from a configuration of A4 is a pseudo-regular execution (Defi-
nition 8, page 21). In A4, the predicate ¬unRegular(u) is closed
Proof: Let c4 be a configuration of A4. In c4, no process is influential and unRegular and
no process verifies the predicate PowerFaulty according to the definition of A4. Let cs be a
computation step from c4 reaching the configuration c5. In c4, no process verifies on of the
both predicates PowerFaulty and StrongEReady. So during cs, r does not executes the rule
RC1 or RC2. According to Lemma 30, c5 ∈ A4. So during cs, no process executes the rule
RC3 or RC4.
According to Lemma 31, the rule RC5 is disabled on processes verifying the predicate inLe-
galTree. We conclude that during cs, processes verifying the predicate inLegalTree execute
only the rules R1 to R7. Hence, any execution from c4 is a safe execution (Definition 7,
page 21).
During cs, a process u becomes unRegular if it executes the rule R3 to choose as a parent an
unRegular process v having the status Power. We have Influential(v) and ¬inLegalTree(v),
in c4. It is impossible according to the definition of A4. We conclude that any execution
from c4 is a pseudo-regular execution. 2
Lemma 33 On any configuration of A4, the predicate Ok(r) is verified.
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Proof: The predicate Faulty(r), IllegalLiveRoot(r) and IllegalChild(r) are never verified.
The predicate PowerFaulty(r) is not verified in c4 ∈ A4. In c4, if the predicate StrongConflict(r)
is verified then Conflict(r) is verified. Assume that Conflict(r) is verified in c4. First case,
in c4, r has a neighbor v1 having the Power status but not the r’s color. Second case, in
c4, r has a neighbor v2 having the Power status and Child.r = ∅ (i.e. no process except r
verifies the predicate inLegalTree). So v1 or v2, named v in the sequel, verifies the predicate
(influential(v) ∧ unRegular(v)) in c4. It is impossible. We conclude that in c4, Ok(r) is
verified. 2
Lemma 34 In A4, the predicate ¬unRegular(u) ∧ (inLegalTree(u) ∨ (S.u = Idle)) is
closed.
Proof: Let c4 be a configuration of A4. Let Pre(u) be the predicate unRegular(u) ∨
(¬inLegalTree(u) ∧ (S.u 6= Idle)). Let cs be a computation step from c4 reaching the
configuration c5. Let u be a process verifying Pre(u) in the configuration c5. We have u 6= r,
as inLegalTree(r) is verified in any configuration of A4. Assume that u does not verify Pre(u)
in c4, we have ¬unRegular(u). So in c5, we have ¬unRegular(u) (Lemma 32).
First case, inLegalTree(u) is verified in c4 but not in c5. Hence, u executes R7 during
cs: in c5, we have S.u = Idle : Pre(u) is not verified in c5. Second case, ¬inLegalTree(u)
is verified in c4. Detached(u) is verified in c4, as ¬unRegular(u) is verified. By hypothesis
S.u = Idle in c4. The only R3 may be enabled on u in c4. Hence, in c5, we have S.u = Idle.
Pre(u) is not verified in c5.
We conclude that if in c5, Pre(u) is verified then it is verified in c4. 2
7.1 The termination of the current tree construction in A4
Definition 14 The predicate correct(u) is defined as
[¬unRegular(u) ∧(inLegalTree(u) ∨ (S.u = Idle))] ∧ ((u = r) ∨ (dist(u) < dist(TS.u))
Let A5(l) with 0 ≤ l ≤ D+1 be the set of configurations of A4 verifying ∀ u ∈ V we have
((dist(u) > l) ∨ (C.u = C.r)) and ((dist(u) > l − 1) ∨ correct(u)).
Any configuration where EndLastPhase(r) is verified belong to A5(l) with l ∈ [0,D + 1]
In the sequel, we establish that in at most n(2n + 3) rounds from a configuration of A4,
A5(l) is reached along any execution with l ≥ 0.
A tree construction is composed of phases, a root action is the beginning of a new
phase (R2) or the beginning of a new tree construction (R1). A phase has 3 exclusive
stages: forwarding, expansion, and backwarding. The stages are characterized by the state
of processes in the legal tree (i.e. processes verifying the predicate inLegalTree). During the
forwarding, some influential processes do not have the Power status. During the expansion,
any influential processes have the Power status. In the backwarding, there is no influential
process.
Lemma 35 From a configuration c4 of A4, the forwarding stage takes at most n−1 rounds.
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Proof: Let cs be a computation step from c4 to c4′ where r does not execute any rule. If
in c4′, influential(u) is verified then influential(u) is verified in c4 (see Lemma 4, page 14). If
in c4, S.u = Power is verified then the predicate PowerParent(u) is not verified in c4′. We
conclude that in c4′, PowerParent(u) is verified then PowerParent(u) is verified in c4.
In c4, there is at most n − 1 processes verifying PowerParent. Assume that in c4 there is
0 < l ≤ n− 1 processes verifying PowerParent.
A process u verifying PowerParent(u) as the Idle status so QuietSubTree(u) is verified as
no process is faulty in A4. According to the definition of the predicate PowerParent, in c4
there is a process u verifying and PowerParent(u) and S.P.u = Working. So NewPhase(u) is
verified till PowerParent(u) is verified. As in A4, no processes has the status StrongE, and
RC4 and RC5 are disabled on influential processes. We conclude that R4 or R5 is enabled
at u till PowerParent(u) is verified; so after the first round from c4 there is at most l − 1
processes verifying PowerParent because u does not verify PowerParent. Therefore, after l
rounds, all influential processes have the Power status. 2
Lemma 36 The backwarding stage takes at most n− 1 rounds.
Proof: Let c be a configuration of A4 where no process is influential. Until a r move, no
process is influential (Lemma 4). hc is the maximal height of a Working process in the legal
tree in c (we have hc < n). If hc = 0 then EndPhase(r) is verified; so, it exists 0 ≤ l ≤ D
such that c ∈ A5(l).
Assume that hc > 0. Let u be a Working process in the legal tree. As no process verifies the
Predicate Faulty and no process is influent, all children of u has the Working or Idle status,
and they have the same phase value as u. All Working process in the legal tree at height
hc, verify the predicate EndPhase because their children have the Idle status. They will
verify the predicate EndPhase until their next action (R6 or R7) so they are enabled. We
conclude that at c′ the configuration reached after a single round from c. We have hc > hc′ .
Therefore, after at most hc ≤ n− 1 rounds, a configuration where EndIntermediatePhase(r)
on EndLastPhase(r) is verified is reached. 2
Lemma 37 Whatever is the current configuration of A4 and the execution, the root does an
action during the first 2n+ 3 rounds.
Proof: Lemma 35 establishes that the forwarding stage takes at most n− 1 rounds. The-
orem 4 (page 25) establishes that the expansion stage has a duration of at most 4 rounds.
Lemma 36 establishes that the backwarding stage takes at most n − 1 rounds. From any
configuration after at most 2n+ 2 rounds, a configuration c where EndIntermediatePhase(r)
or EndLastPhase(r) is verified is reached. As in a configuration of A4, no processes has the
status StrongE, and the predicate Ok(r) is verified (Lemma 33). EndIntermediatePhase(r)
or EndLastPhase(r) stays verified until r executes the rule R1 or R2. So r does an action
before the end of the 2n+ 3 rounds from any configuration of A4. 2
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Definition 15 Let #r color(c) be the number of processes having the r color in the config-
uration c.
Lemma 38 Let cs be a computation step from c1 ∈ A4 to reach c2 where r does not executes
R1. We have #r color(c1) ≤ #r color(c2).
Proof: r does not change its color (by hypothesis). Let u be a process that changes its
color during cs: it executes the rule R3 to choose a process, v, having the Power status
as parent. As c1 ∈ A4, inLegalTree(v) is verified in c1; so C.v = C.r = r color. Hence,
C.u = r color in c2. We conclude that #r color(c1) ≤ #r color(c2). 2
Lemma 39 Let e be a execution starting from a configuration of A4. Let cs = (c1, c2) be a
computation step of e where r executes R2. Let cs′ = (c3, c4) the following computation step
of e where r executes a rule. #r color(c1) < #r color(c3) or c3 ∈ A5(l) with 0 ≤ l ≤ D.
Proof: If along e, from c1 to c3, some processes execute R3 then #r color(c1) < #r color(c3).
So assume that no process execute R3 from c1 to c3. All processes verifying inLegalTree in
c1 execute the rule R7. We conclude that EndLastPhase(r) is verified in c3. 2
Theorem 5 Let c be configuration of A4. along any execution from c a configuration of
A5(l) with 0 ≤ l ≤ D + 1 is reached in n(2n+ 3)− 1 rounds.
Proof: Let e be an execution starting from a configuration of A4. There are at most n− 1
consecutive computation steps of r in which R2 is executed. At most 2n + 2 rounds are
between two actions of r (Lemma 37). 2
7.2 Tree constructions from A5(l)
In this subsection, we establish that in at most n(n+3) rounds from a configuration of A5(l)
with l ≤ D, A5(l+1) is reached along any execution.
For 0 ≤ k ≤ l, A4(k, l) is the set containing all configurations reached during the kth phase
of a tree construction starting from a configuration of A5(l).
Definition 16 Let A4(k,l) with 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ D + 1 be the set of configurations of A4 where
every process u verifies the following predicates:
• if dist(u) < l then correct(u)
• if dist(u) ≤ k − 1 then C.u = C.r
• if k < dist(u) ≤ l then C.u 6= C.r
• if dist(u) = k − 1 then
(∀v ∈ N(u) | C.v = C.r) ∨ (influential(u) ∧ (Child(u) = ∅ ∨ S.u = Power))
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• if dist(u) = k then
C.u 6= C.r ∨
[inLegalTree(u) ∧ ¬influential(u) ∧
S.u = Idle ∧ Child(u) = ∅ ∧ correct(u)]
• if k ≤ dist(u) then S.u ∈ {Idle,Working,WeakE}
Observation 5 From a configuration of A5(l), any computation step where r executes the
rule R1 reaches a configuration of A4(1, l) verifying
• if dist(u) < l then correct(u)
• if 1 ≤ dist(u) ≤ l then C.u 6= C.r
• S.r = Power
• if u 6= r then S.u ∈ {Idle,Working,WeakE}
Lemma 40 Let c be a configuration of A4(k,l) with 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ D + 1. Let cs be a
computation step from c reaching c′. Let u verifying dist(u) < l+ 1. If correct(u) is verified
in c then correct(u) is verified in c′.
Proof: The following predicate is closed according to Lemmas 34:
[¬unRegular(u) ∧ ∧ (inLegalTree(u) ∨ (S.u = Idle))].
If dist(u) < dist(TS.u) in c then this predicate is verified in c′ when u does not execute
R3 during cs.
If dist(u) > k, R3 is disabled on u in c because none of its neighbor is influential. If
dist(u) < k, R3 is disabled on u in c because any influential process has the u color.
Assume that dist(u) = k and u executes R3 during cs. In c′, we have dist(TS.u) = k − 1
because in the neighborhood of u, only processes at distance k− 1 of r may be influential in
c. 2
Observation 6 Let c be a configuration of A4 where u is influential. Let cs be a computation
step from c reaching c′. During cs, u may execute one of the following rule R1, R2, R5, R6
or R7. Process u is influential in c′, if u does not execute the rule R2, R6 or R7 during cs.
Lemma 41 Let c be a configuration of A4(k,l) with 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ D + 1. Let cs be a
computation step from c reaching c′. If r does not execute any rule then c′ is a configuration
of A4(k,l).
Proof: r color is the same in c and in c′. In c′, we have
• if dist(u) < l then correct(u); because the predicate (correct(u) ∧ dist(u) < l) is closed
(Lemma 40) and it is verified in c.
• if dist(u) ≤ k−1 then C.u = C.r, because R3 is disabled on u in c, so u keeps its color.
• if k < dist(u) ≤ l then C.u 6= C.r, because R3 is disabled on u in c, so u keeps its
color.
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• assume that dist(u) = k − 1. if in c, (∀v ∈ N(u) | C.v = C.r) then this property is
verified in c′ as R3 is disabled on any u’ neighbor.
Assume that in c, u has a neighbor v verifying (C.v 6= C.r). As c belongs to A4(k,l),
influential(u) is verified. During cs, u may only execute the rule R5, so influential(u) is
verified in c′. If in c, S.u = Power then u is disabled; so S.u = Power in c′. Otherwise
Child(u) = ∅ ∧ S.u 6= Power in c, (by hypothesis); in that case, Child(u) = ∅ in c′.
• Assume that dist(u) = k. If (C.u 6= C.r) in the configuration c then this property
is verified in the configuration c′ or u executes R3 during cs. In the latest case,
according to the definition of R3 action, in c′, we have S.u = Idle, Child(u) = ∅, and
¬ influential(u). According to the definition of A4(k,l), in c′, we have inLegalTree(u),
dist(TS.u) = k − 1. So, the predicate Pre(u) ≡ (inLegalTree(u) ∧ ¬ influential(u) ∧
S.u = Idle ∧ Child(u) = ∅ ∧ correct(u)) is verified in c′.
Otherwise, the predicate Pre(u) is verified in c by hypothesis. The predicate correct(u)
is verified in c′ (Lemma 40). As any execution from c is pseudo-regular (Lemma 32) and
Pre(u) is verified in c , Process u is disabled in c. So S.u = Idle, is verified in c′. In A4,
the predicate inLegalTree(u) is verified until u executes R7. ¬ influential(u) is verified
in c′ as ¬ influential(u) is verified in c (Lemma 4, page 14). S.u = Idle ∧ Child(u) = ∅
is verified in c, hence Child(u) = ∅ is verified in c′. We conclude that Pre(u) is verified
in c′.
• if k ≤ dist(u) then S.u ∈ {Idle,Working,WeakE}. The processes at distance k,
do not have child if they are in the legal tree. We conclude that the predicate
inLegalTree(u) is not verified; so u is be influential as c ∈ A4.
2
Observation 7 Let c be a configuration of A4 where r is enabled. There is not influen-
tial process, so R3, R4, and R5 are disabled on any process in c. A process u verifying
inLegalTree(u) is disabled in c and S.u = Idle, ph.u = ph.r.
Lemma 42 Let cs be a computation step from c(k) ∈ A4(k, l) with 1 ≤ k < l ≤ D+1 where
r executes a rule. The reached configuration c belongs to (k + 1, l) and r executes the rule
R2.
Proof: c(k) ∈ A4(k, l) verifies the predicate :
• EndIntermediatePhase(r)
• if dist(u) < l then correct(u)
• if dist(u) ≤ k then C.u = C.r
• if k < dist(u) ≤ l then C.u 6= C.r
• if dist(u) = k then
(inLegalTree(u) ∧ ¬influential(u) ∧ S.u = Idle ∧ Child(u) = ∅ ∧ correct(u))
• if k + 1 ≤ dist(u) then S.u ∈ {Idle,Working,WeakE}
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The predicate correct(u) is verified in c (Lemma 40). During cs, a process u 6= r may execute
only the rule R6, R7, RC5, or RC6 (Observation 7). During cs, r executes R2. A process u
verifying inLegalTree(u) in c(k) is influential in c (Lemma 4, page 14). 2
We define A4(l + 1, l) such that this set contains all configurations reached during the
last phases of a tree construction starting from a configuration of A5(l); more precisely, the
latest phases are phases k with (k > l).
Definition 17 Let A4(l+1,l) with l ≤ D be the set of configurations of A4 where every
process u verifies the following predicates:
• if dist(u) ≤ l then correct(u) and C.u = C.r
• if dist(u) = l and (∃v ∈ N(u) | C.v 6= C.r) then
Influential(u) and (Child(u) = ∅ or S.u = Power)
The proof of the following lemma is similar to the proof of lemma 41.
Lemma 43 Let c be a configuration of A4(l+1,l) with l ≤ D. Let cs be a computation step
from c reaching c′. If r does not execute R1 then c′ is a configuration of A4(l+1,l).
Proof: r color is the same in c and in c′. In c′, we have
• by hypothesis, correct(u) is verified in c. According to Lemma 34, if dist(u) <
dist(TS.u) in c then correct(u) is verified in c′ in the case where u does not exe-
cute R3 during cs. If dist(u) ≤ l, R3 is disabled on u in c because any influential
process has the u color.
• if dist(u) ≤ l then C.u = C.r, because R3 is disabled on u in c, so u keeps its color.
• assume that dist(u) = l. If in c, (∀v ∈ N(u) | C.v = C.r) then this property is verified
in c′ as R3 are disabled on any u’ neighbor..
Assume that in c, u has a neighbor v verifying (C.v 6= C.r). As c belongs to A4(l+1,l),
influential(u) is verified. During cs, u may only execute the rule R5, so influential(u) is
verified in c′. If in c, S.u = Power then u is disabled; so S.u = Power in c′. Otherwise
Child(u) = ∅ ∧ S.u 6= Power in c, (by hypothesis); in that case Child(u) = ∅ in c′.
2
Lemma 44 Let cs be a computation step from c(l) ∈ A4(l, l) with l ≤ D where r executes a
rule. r executes R2 and the reached configuration c belongs to A4(l + 1, l).
Proof: c(l) ∈ A4(l, l) verifies the predicate :
• EndIntermediatePhase(r)
• if dist(u) ≤ l then correct(u)
• if dist(u) ≤ l then C.u = C.r
• if dist(u) = l then
(inLegalTree(u) ∧ ¬influential(u) ∧ S.u = Idle ∧ Child(u) = ∅ ∧ correct(u))
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• if l + 1 ≤ dist(u) then S.u ∈ {Idle,Working,WeakE}
During cs, a process u 6= r may execute only the rule R6, R7, RC5, or RC6 (Observation 7).
2
Lemma 45 Let cs be a computation step from c(l+ 1) ∈ A4(l+ 1, l) ∪ A4(D+ 1,d iam+ 1)
with l ≤ D+1 where r executes the rule R1. c(l+1) belongs to A5(l+1) if c(l+1) ∈ A4(l+1, l)
otherwise c(l + 1) belongs to A5(D + 1).
Proof: If c(l + 1) ∈ A4(l + 1, l) it verifies the properties :
• EndLastPhase(r)
• if dist(u) ≤ l then correct(u)
• if dist(u) ≤ l + 1 then C.u = C.r
• if l + 1 ≤ dist(u) then S.u ∈ {Idle,Working,WeakE}
If c(l + 1) ∈ A4(D + 1,D + 1)) it verifies the properties :
• EndLastPhase(r)
• if dist(u) ≤ D then correct(u) and C.u = C.r
2
7.3 Legitimate configurations
Let Al be the set of configurations defined as
⋃
u∈[0,D+1]A4(k,D + 1)
A4(k,D+ 1) contains all reached configurations during the kth phase of a tree construction
starting from a configuration of Al.
According to the definition of predicate correct, and Lemmas 41, 42, and 45.
Corollary 8 Al is closed.
Let c be a configuration in Al. In c, for every process u 6= r we have dist(u) > dist(TS.u).
Theorem 6 Al is reached from a configuration ofA4 after at most (D+ 2)n(2n+ 3) rounds.
Proof: According to Theorem 5, in at most n(2n+ 3)− 1 rounds from a configuration of
A4, a configuration of A5(l) with 0 ≤ l ≤ D + 1 is reached along any execution.
From a configuration of A5(l) with 0 ≤ l ≤ D + 1 a configuration of A4(1, l) is reached
after a round.
Assume that l < D + 1. According to Theorem 5, in at most n(2n+ 3)− 1 rounds from
a configuration of A4(1, l) with 0 ≤ l < D + 1, a configuration of A5(l’), c(l′), is reached.
According to lemmas 41, 42, 43, and 44, c(l′) ∈ A4(l+ 1, l). We have l′ = l+ 1 (Lemma 45).
So, in at most n(2n + 3) − 1 rounds from a configuration of A4(1, l) with l < D, A5(l+1)
is reached along any execution. Hence, from a configuration of A4(1, l) with l < D + 1, a
configuration of A4(1, l+ 1) is reached in at most n(2n+ 3) rounds. We conclude that from
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a configuration of A4(1, l) with 0 ≤ l < D + 1, a configuration of A4(1,D + 1) is reached in
at most (D + 1)n(2n + 3) rounds. Hence, from a configuration of A4, a configuration of Al
is reached along any execution in at most (D + 2)n(2n+ 3) rounds. 2
Corollary 9 Al is reached from any configuration after at most 2Dn2+4n2+O(Dn) rounds.
Any execution from a configuration of Al is a regular execution.
Theorem 7 In Al a complete BFS tree construction is done in D2 + 3D + 1 rounds. A
process executes at most 2D + 1 moves during a complete BFS tree construction.
Proof: We have A5(D + 1) ⊂ Al. From a configuration of A5(D + 1), a tree construction
is done in D + 1 phase. The first phase is done in 2 rounds : r executes the rule R1, then r
neighbors (if they exists) execute the rule R3. At the end of the first phase, all processes at
distance 1 of r are Idle leaves of the legal tree. The kth phase takes 2k rounds if 1 < k ≤ D:
• during the first round of the phase, r execute R2,
• during the round 2 ≤ i < k, inLegalTree processes at distance i− 1 of r executes the rule
R4,
• during the round k, processes at distance k − 1 of r executes R5,
• during the round k + 1, processes at distance k of r execute R3,
• during the round k + 2 ≤ i + k + 1 ≤ 2k, inLegalTree processes at distance k − i of r
executes the rule R7 or R6.
At the end of the phase k ≤ D, all processes at distance k of r are the Idle leaves of the
legal tree. The D + 1th phase takes 2D + 1 rounds :
• during the first round of the phase, r execute R2,
• during the round 2 ≤ i < D+ 1, inLegalTree processes at distance i− 1 of r executes the
rule R4,
• during the round D + 1, processes at distance D of r executes R5,
• during the round D + 2 ≤ i + D + 2 ≤ 2D + 1, inLegalTree processes at distance D − i
of r executes the rule R7 (they quit the legal tree).
At the end of the phase D + 1 a configuration of A5(D + 1) is reached. A tree construction
is done in (D + 2)(D + 1)− 1 rounds.
From a configuration of A5(D + 1), during a single tree construction the move of r be-
longs to language R1(R2)D; and the moves of u at distance l of r belongs to the language
R3R5(R6R4)iR7 with 0 ≤ i ≤ D − l. 2
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